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Abstract
Moulin (1981a) has argued in favour of electing an alternative by giv-
ing each coalition the ability to veto a number of alternatives roughly
proportional to the size of the coalition and considering the core of the
resulting cooperative game. This core is guaranteed to be non-empty
(Moulin, 1981a), and offers a large measure of protection for minorities
(Kondratev and Nesterov, 2020). However, as is the norm for cooperative
game theory the formulation of the concept involves considering all pos-
sible coalitions of voters, so the na¨ıve algorithm would run in exponential
time, limiting the application of the rule to trivial cases only. In this work
we present a polynomial time algorithm to compute the proportional veto
core.
1 Introduction
Suppose we have a society of 100 individuals, and they are asked to express
their preferences over alternatives a and b. The result is the following:
• 51 individuals report a ≻ b.
• 49 individuals report b ≻ a.
Which alternative should the society adopt? If we presume that all individuals
are equal, and there are no legal, ethical, etc, reasons to a priori prefer b to
a, it seems difficult to justify any outcome but a. In a manner that can be
made precise (May, 1952), majority voting is the only reasonable way to pick a
winner out of two alternatives. But what if we modify the preceding example
by inserting a third alternative c and obtain the following:
• 51 individuals report a ≻ b ≻ c.
• 49 individuals report b ≻ c ≻ a.
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Now, the solution is no longer obvious, and is very much contingent on just who
these “individuals” are, and what they are trying to achieve. If, for example,
each preference order represents the results of a sporting event then the case can
be made that a should still be the winner – the fact that b is a more consistent
competitor does not change the fact that, put face to face, a has a tendency
to beat b. Likewise, if these are legislators’ preferences over bills, a is the only
bill that has the support of a parliamentary majority, and is thus unlikely to
be overturned in the future. But what if the preferences are over government
budgets? The locations of a school? The soundtrack of a busy shopping centre?
Are we willing to write off the interests of almost half the population to satisfy
the majority?
Should we decide that in our context the minority matters, a natural ap-
proach is to turn the problem on its head: rather than ask which alternative to
elect, we ask which should we prevent from winning. Mueller (1978) considers
the procedure of voting by veto to select a public good, with the explicit aim of
protecting an individual from unfair treatment. The alternatives consist of one
proposal from each voter, as well as the status quo. An order is formed over the
voters and each, in turn, strikes off the alternative they like the least. Exactly
one outcome is selected by this procedure, but this procedure, like others of its
kind, is not anonymous.
The strategic properties of this procedure, and its variants, have been studied
extensively. The sincere outcome of voting by veto has been shown to correspond
to a strong equilibrium solution (Peleg, 1978), dominance solution (Moulin,
1980), and maxmin behaviour (Moulin, 1981b); the general message seems to be
that while truth-telling may not be an equilibrium, among equally sophisticated
voters the same alternative can be expected to be elected.
Moulin (1981a) extended the concept of voting by veto from individuals to
coalitions, and studied the core of the resulting cooperative game. The core as
a solution to a voting situation is problematic as the ideal number of winners is
one, but the core could be larger or smaller, but Moulin has shown that endowing
each coalition with the power to veto a number of alternatives proportional to
the coalition’s size guarantees that the core is non-empty, and is the smallest
possible core out of all such rules. Moreover, such veto power is necessary for
implementation via strong equilibrium (Moulin, 1982).
Kondratev and Nesterov (2020) investigated this proportional veto core in
the context of balancing the rights of minorities and majorities, and their main
criticism of the rule was that it is unclear how the core is to be computed – the
na¨ıve algorithm is exponential. In this work we demonstrate that a polynomial
solution exists.
2 Preliminaries
Let V be the set of n voters and A the set of m alternatives. Every voter i has
strict preferences over A, which we denote by ≻i.
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Definition 2.1. The proportional veto power of a coalition is given by:
v(T ) =
⌈
m
|T |
n
⌉
− 1.
We say that an alternative c is blocked by a coalition T just if there exists a set
of alternatives B such that:
∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ T : b ≻i c, (1)
m− |B| ≤ v(T ) (2)
Condition (1) means that every voter in T considers every alternative in B to be
strictly better than c, and condition (2) means that the coalition T can guarantee
that the winner will be among B by blocking all the other alternatives.
The set of all alternatives that are not blocked is called the proportional veto
core. 
Moulin (1981a) showed that the proportional veto core is always non-empty,
and is thus a function mapping profiles to non-empty sets of alternatives – in
other words, it can be viewed as a voting rule, albeit with a high incidence of
ties.
Example 2.2. Consider a profile with 5 alternatives and four voters with the
following preferences:
• e ≻1 b ≻1 c ≻1 d ≻1 a.
• b ≻2 e ≻2 c ≻2 d ≻2 a.
• d ≻3 b ≻3 e ≻3 c ≻3 a.
• a ≻4 c ≻4 d ≻4 e ≻4 b.
In the case of m = n+1 the veto power of a coalition simplifies to
⌈
(n+ 1) k
n
⌉
−
1 = k. In other words, k voters can block exactly k alternatives.
Alternative a is blocked by the singleton coalition { 1 } (among others), with
B = { b, c, d, e }; b is blocked by { 4 }, with B = { a, c, d, e }; d is not blocked
by any singletons, but is blocked by { 1, 2 }, with B = { b, c, e }; c is blocked by
the coalition { 1, 2, 3 } with B = { b, e }. Thus the unique alternative in the core
is e.
Now let us add a fifth voter:
• c ≻5 a ≻5 d ≻5 b ≻5 e.
With m = n, the veto power simplifies to
⌈
n k
n
⌉
− 1 = k − 1. A singleton
coalition can no longer block anything, but the coalition { 1, 2 } can block a
with B = { b, c, d, e }. However, no other alternative is blocked, so the core is
{ b, c, d, e }. 
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3 The algorithm
First, recall that the maximum vertex blicique problem is solvable in polynomial
time.
Proposition 3.1. Let G = (L,R) be a bipartite graph, and k > max(|L|, |R|) an
integer. We can, in polynomial time, determine whether there exists a complete
bipartite subgraph Kx,y ⊆ G, such that x+ y ≥ k.
Proof. The following argument seems to date to Garey and Johnson (1979).
By Ko˝nig’s theorem (Knig, 1931), the size of the maximum matching in a
bipartite graph is equal to the size of the smallest vertex cover. The complement
of the smallest vertex cover is the maximum independent set. The size of the
maximum independent set in the graph equals the size of the maximum biclique
in the bipartite-complement of the graph, provided that the size is greater than
max(|L|, |R|).1
Therefore take G, construct its bipartite-complement G and find the size of
the maximum matching, t, which is necessarily not greater than min(|L|, |R|).
The size of the maximum independent set inG is then |L|+|R|−t ≥ max(|L|, |R|).
If the inequality is strict, then the size of the maximum biclique Kx,y in G is
x+ y = |L|+ |R| − t and we just need to compare it with k.
We will also need the following lemma of Moulin (1981a)
Lemma 3.2. If rn = tm − α, where α = gcd(m,n) is the greatest common
divisor of m and n, t > αn, then for k ≤ n:
⌈
m
k
n
⌉
− 1 =
⌊
rk
t
⌋
.
Proof. From rn = tm− α we obtain kr
t
= km
n
− kα
tn
.
Case one: km
n
is an integer. In this case:
⌊
rk
t
⌋
=
⌊
km
n
−
kα
tn
⌋
=
⌈
m
k
n
⌉
− 1.
1Otherwise, the independent set could consist entirely of one of the partitions of the graph.
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Case two: km
n
=
⌊
km
n
⌋
+ ǫ, ǫ ∈ [ 1
n
, . . . , n−1
n
]. In this case
⌈
m k
n
⌉
−1 =
⌊
mk
n
⌋
, and:⌊
rk
t
⌋
=
⌊
km
n
−
kα
tn
⌋
=
⌊
km
n
⌋
+
⌊
ǫ−
kα
tn
⌋
≥
⌊
km
n
⌋
+
⌊
ǫ−
1
n
⌋
≥
⌊
km
n
⌋
.
The equality follows because it is clear that
⌊
km
n
− kα
tn
⌋
≤
⌊
km
n
⌋
.
Theorem 3.3. The proportional veto core can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We shall show that we can check whether a fixed alternative c is blocked
in polynomial time – we can then find the core by running the algorithm below
on every alternative.
Consider a veto instance with n voters and m alternatives. Using the Ex-
tended Euclidean algorithm we can find r′, t′ such that r′n = t′m − α, where
α = gcd(m,n), and |t′| ≤ n
α
in polynomial time. It is easy to see that with
(r, t) = (r′ + 2αm, t′ + 2αn), we have rn = tm− α and t > αn. By Lemma 3.2,
the veto power of a coalition of size k is
⌊
rk
t
⌋
.
Construct a bipartite graph G with rn vertices on the left and t(m − 1)
vertices on the right. Every voter is associated with r vertices on the left and
every alternative but c with t vertices on the right. Add an edge between every
voter vertex and every alternative vertex that voter considers to be better than c.
Observe thatG has rn < tm vertices on the left and t(m−1) < tm vertices on
the right. So by Proposition 3.1 we can, in polynomial time, determine whether
there exists a complete bipartite subgraph Kx,y ⊆ G, such that x+ y ≥ tm. We
claim that the answer is yes if and only if c is blocked.
Suppose that c is blocked by coalition T of size k. This means there exists
a B, |B| = m −
⌊
rk
t
⌋
, such that the voters in T strictly prefer everything in
B to c. Observe that the vertices associated with T and B form a complete
bipartite subgraph with rk + tm − t
⌊
rk
t
⌋
vertices. Since rk
t
≥
⌊
rk
t
⌋
, it follows
that rk ≥ t
⌊
rk
t
⌋
and the graph has at least tm vertices.
Now suppose there exists a complete bipartite subgraph Kx,y ⊆ G with
x + y ≥ tm. Without loss of generality, we can assume x = rk′, y = tb′. That
is, there are k′ voters who all agree that b′ alternatives are better than c. We
must show that the coalition has enough veto power to force this outcome:⌊
rk′
t
⌋
≥ m− b′. We know that:
rk′ + tb′ ≥ tm
rk′ ≥ tm− tb′
rk′
t
≥ m− b′.
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Since m− b′ is an integer it follows that
⌊
rk′
t
⌋
≥ m− b′.
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